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Introduction 
 
China’s economy has experienced dramatic growth in the last 30 years. 
Since the 1990s, Chinese seafarers were expected to sweep the world’s 
seafarers’ labour market. Although China’s seafarer labour export has been 
growing since the 1990s, it is still lower than the expectation of the 
international shipping industry and some academics (BIMCO/ISF 1995; Li 
and Wonham 1999; Sharma 2002; Wu 2004; Wu, Shen, and Li 2007).  
This article aims to explain the overestimates of the likely progress of 
China’s seafarer export by illustrating the extent of the reform and market 
orientation of China’s state-owned crewing agencies (SCAs). It draws on 
fieldwork conducted between 2008 and 2013 in two SCAs, which have 
reformed to different degrees and represent the largest examples of two 
types of Chinese crewing agencies that dominate the seafarer labour export 
in China. It systematically examines the employment and labour supply 
strategies of the agencies and the consequences for seafarers and seafarer 
labour export. It raises the questions of the government and the higher 
institutions’ interventions in the SCAs and the extent of their reforms in 
affecting the seafarers and the seafarer labour export. 
 
The idea of ‘going globally’ 
 
Since the late 1990s, articles in trade papers for the maritime industry have 
reported that China’s seafarer export will increase remarkably (Lloyd’s Ship 
Manager 1999; Lloyd’s list, 23 October 2000; 14 March 2008). In the 
academic field, BIMCO/ISF (1995) estimated that China’s seafarer export 
would increase to more than 89,000 by 2000 to 104,000 by 2005. In 2000 
and 2005, however, only 38,164 and 41,260 Chinese seafarers, 
respectively, worked in the global labour market, representing only 42.8% 
and 39.7% of the numbers predicted by BIMCO/ISF, respectively. Li and 
Wonham (1999) evaluated the report of BIMCO/ISF (1995) and argued that 
BIMCO/ISF had underestimated China’s export of its seafarers in the 2000s, 
and that it could be the alternative to the Philippines as the largest supplier 
of global seafaring labour (1999, 299).  
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Sharma (2002) predicted that China would emerge as the new leader of 
the global seafaring labour market after evaluating the advantages and 
drawbacks of China in seafarer export. Wu et al. argued for the substantial 
increase of China’s seafarer export by considering two aspects. On the one 
hand, they deemed that the emergence of the hundreds of crewing agencies 
in the market opens new channels for Chinese seafarers to work onboard 
foreign ships (Wu, Shen, and Li 2007). On the other hand, consequent to 
China’s economic reform, the planned employment system in the planned 
economy period was destroyed, and consequently, seafarers will flood the 
world’s seafarer labour market due to the attractiveness of working in 
foreign shipping companies, such as better payment (Wu 2004; Wu, Lai, 
and Cheng 2006; Wu, Shen, and Li 2007).  
However, China has been ranked the 4th/5th largest country in terms of 
maritime manpower supply in the world since the 2000s. Still, China’s 
seafarer supply represented around one-fourth/ fifth of the seafarer export 
of the Philippines in both the 1990s and the 2000s (Bao and Liu 2008; POEA 
2007a, 2007b). In 2013, the Philippines exported 367,166 seafarers, more 
than three times higher than 119,316 seafarers that China supplied (MSA 
2014; POEA 2015).  
In contrast to this overestimation, few researchers inclined to a cautious 
analysis of Chinese seafarer export. Shen et al. (2005) and Zhao (2000, 
2002) discuss the reform of China’s seafarer labour market and analyse 
potential constraints for the development of seafarer export, such as the 
development of the social security system, the English-speaking ability of 
Chinese seafarers and the dynamics of the world seafarers’ labour market. 
The authors conclude that, in light of the problems, there is no simple 
answer when considering the nature of Chinese seafarers on the world 
market.  
Whatever the assumptions and expectations, the leading recent literature 
on the Chinese seafarer export is marked by an important omission: it 
makes scant use of systematic evidence from Chinese workers and 
managers themselves to examine the extent of market orientation of 
crewing agencies or their capacity to man foreign ships. Despite these 
works’ considerable merits, the question of how Chinese ship crewing 
agencies have reformed the organization and how seafarers regard the 
management of their crewing agencies is neglected. In short, some studies 
have focused on the Chinese seafarer labour export, but to the neglect of 
how these crewing agencies operate and to what extent the crewing 
agencies have reformed into market-oriented economic entities that play a 
central role in this.  
This gives rise to a number of elementary questions: To what extent the 
SCAs can decide their business? To what extent managers are actively 
involved into reforming management in order to improve its market 
efficiency? What specific management methods are applied by the crewing 
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agencies? And what are the consequent impacts on seafarers and on 
foreign manning business? Answering these questions may contribute to 
the understanding of the overestimates of the likely progress of China’s 
seafarer export.  
Given the lack of systematic evidence in the literature on these and related 
questions, the article seeks to explore the questions with the help of 86 
semi-structured and in-depth interviews conducted between 2008 and 2013 
in two Chinese SCAs (hereinafter referred to as SA and IA; for more details 
please refer to Tables 1 and 2). The crewing agencies in the case studies 
have reformed to different degrees with respect to the precise details of 
dependence on higher institutions and state, market relations (domestic and 
foreign) and management. They represent the largest examples of two 
types of Chinese crewing agencies that dominate the seafarer labour export. 
The study of the agencies allows an evaluation of the operations of the most 
important players in the Chinese seafaring labour market.  
Before looking at the case studies, the article provides a macro social and 
economic back-ground by introducing the reform of Chinese economy, 
seafarer labour market and ship crewing agencies. 
 
   
Table 1. Interviews conducted between 2008 
And 2013.   
Years 2008 and 2011 2012–2013  
Interviews taken in SA 11 interviews with managers and 23 with 4 interviews with managers and 3 with 
 seafarers seafarers  
Interviews taken in IA 11 interviews with managers and 27 with 4 interviews with managers and 3 with 
 seafarers seafarers  
Number of interviews in total 72 interviews 14 interviews  
Identity and post of interviewees Director, the Chair of the Trade Union, the Training manager, the Human Research  
in SA Management (HRM) manager, the Manning manager, the Vice Director of the Head 
 Office and the Director of the parent shipping company (PSC); Seafarers of all ranks 
Identity and post of interviewees Director, the HRM manager, the Manning manager, the Chair of the trade union, the 
in IA Business manager and the Training manager; Seafarers of all ranks  
 A majority of the interviews lasted at least 1 h and was voice-recorded.   
 
 
 
Table 2. Basic Information about IA and SA.   
Company name IA SA 
Category ISCA SSCA 
Year established 1985 1995 
Main client Foreign shipping companies PSC 
The number of ships manned in total in 2013 32 43 
The number of foreign ships manned in 2013 32 9 
The number of staff in 2013 20 58 
The number of regularly employed seafarers in 2013 722 3380 
The ranks of seafarers Mainly officer seafarers All ranks 
The number of freelance seafarers employed in 2013 387 0  
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China’s economic reform, seafarer labour market reform and ship 
crewing agencies 
 
Before the economic reform in 1979, all political and economic activities in 
China were strictly planned and directly controlled by the Chinese 
government. Chinese enterprises were all state-owned. In 1979, the 
economic reform was introduced in China in order to improve the economy.  
Power decentralization from the government and authority acquisition of 
the enterprises were the main focus of the enterprise reform. With the 
implementation of key reform measures, most of the state-owned 
enterprises (SOEs) were no longer supported by the government in theory, 
but supposed to operate independently and to be responsible for its profits 
and losses. Small and medium SOEs that could not survive the market 
competition were allowed to be merged/ purchased by private-owned 
enterprises and foreign-invested enterprises. To establish a modern market 
system, the Chinese government at different levels published various 
preferential policies to attract investments from the private and foreign 
sectors. The non-state companies, making their appearance in the late 
1980s in China, have grown rapidly since the 1990s. They contributed 
tremendously to the growth of China’s economy (Garnaut et al. 2012).  
The emergence and development of Chinese seafaring labour market was 
the result of the economic reform. Before 1979, there was no labour market 
in China, as all workers were assigned by the government to certain work 
units (danwei) according to the government’s plan. Since the 1990s, the 
evolution of the Chinese seafaring labour market has been pushed forward 
by several main forces. First, as a result of the economic reform the central 
government replaced the planned workers’ assignment mechanism with a 
free, two-way selection system between employees and employers. Second, 
the reform of shipping companies, especially the emergence and 
development of private-owned and foreign-invested companies, caused a 
huge demand on seafaring labour employed on fixed-term contracts. Third, 
the implementation of the Labour Law in 1995 enabled SOEs that 
possessed most of the seafaring labour to fire workers, and to ‘liberalize’ 
Chinese workers from traditional lifelong employment status to employment 
based on fixed-term con-tracts (Shen et al. 2005). 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. The contract relationships in the foreign manning process. 
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Based on these main forces, hundreds of crewing agencies were set up 
to allocate labour resources to meet the demands of shipping companies. 
With the opening of a global seafaring labour market to China, Chinese 
seafarers can in principle work onboard foreign ships. According to the 
Labour Laws of 1995 and the New Labour Contract Law of 2008, Chinese 
workers working overseas are not allowed to be directly employed by 
foreign employers. This regulation aims to protect China’s shipping 
companies from foreign competition for labour resources.  
Chinese crewing agencies granted foreign manning qualifications serve 
to facilitate the parti-cipation of Chinese seafarers in the global labour 
market. In the manning process, different sorts of contractual relations are 
involved (Figure 1). Seafarers first sign an employment contract with a 
Chinese crewing agency which consequently becomes the buyer of the 
seafarers’ labour power and decides all employment issues, e.g. wages, 
working hours, holidays, etc. Chinese seafarers rely directly on the agencies 
for employment. The crewing agency then signs a dispatching contract with 
the foreign ship owner as the user of the seafarers’ labour, paying the 
agencies for the labour. Chinese seafarers have no way to get in touch with 
foreign ship owners or to read this dispatching contract. They know nothing 
about the contents of the contract. Because of such an employment 
mechanism in China, despite various policies to reform the labour market 
since the 1980s (Tang, Llangco, and Zhao 2015), including the policy 
enacted on 1 March 2015 that enables individuals to apply for the seafarer 
licenses directly instead of through an agency, Chinese seafarers are still 
unable to freely choose their foreign employers and it is the crewing 
agencies that completely control seafarers’ working opportunities onboard 
foreign ships in China.  
Of Chinese crewing agencies, SCAs have dominated the foreign manning 
business in China due to the supports of the government, such as granting 
foreign manning qualifications and financial subsidies. It was reported that: 
 
Between 1979 and 1998, COSCOMAN [COSCO’s Manning Agency] 
employed 150,000 Chinese seafarers for foreign ship owners and 
operators, enjoying the lion’s share of the market (60%). MASES [a 
crewing agency owned by China Shipping] follows with a total supply 
of 40,000 seafarers during its ten years of business between 1988 and 
1998, taking a market share of 16% (Zhao 2000, 4). 
 
Until the twenty-first century, the dominant position of the SCAs was still 
evident. At the end of 2006, for instance, China dispatched 39,300 seafarers 
in total out of which the large SCAs dispatched more than 70%. In 2012, the 
large SCAs took a market share of around 65%, which in 2013 increased to 
68% (interview with an MSA officer, 23 July 2013). The rest were manned 
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mainly by small SCAs. Private-owned crewing agencies played only a minor 
role. So far only one foreign invested crewing agency established itself in 
China, therefore contributing minimally (MSA 2014).  
To see further reasons why Chinese seafarers have not yet swept the 
world’s seafarers’ labour market, this article focuses on the operation of the 
SCAs that dominate the business in China. 
 
 
Two types of SCAs in China and the two agencies in the case studies 
 
SCAs in China can be roughly divided into two types. One is an independent 
SCA (ISCA), which is not affiliated to any shipping company. The other is a 
subsidiary crewing agency of a state-owned shipping company (known, for 
short, as subsidiary SCA (SSCA)).  
ISCAs are established by the Chinese government at several levels. With 
political support of the government they have been granted foreign manning 
qualifications since their emergence at the beginning of the 1980s. In 
addition, ISCAs employ a number of registered seafarers, the vast majority 
of whom are officers, signing fixed-term contract with the agencies (5–8 
years). Ratings are temporarily employed because freelance ratings in 
China are redundant and thereby, easy to find and cheap to use.  
The ISCA in the case study (hereinafter referred to as Independent 
Agency (IA)) was set up in the autumn of 1985 by the municipal government. 
IA has cooperated with foreign shipping companies since its establishment. 
It is one of the crewing agencies with the longest history and also one of the 
most influential agencies in China. IA is not affiliated to any shipping 
company, but is supposed to operate independently, being responsible for 
its profits and losses.  
SSCA is another type of SCA in China. Unlike ISCAs, which are 
established by the govern-ment, SSCAs are set up by state-owned shipping 
companies through the reform of ‘separating the management of the 
seafaring labour resource from the management of ships’ (ren chuan fenli), 
proposed by the Chinese central government in the 1990s. The goal of 
setting up SSCAs was to improve the professionalism of seafaring labour 
management, thus providing more job opportu-nities and improving 
shipping companies’ profits by reducing labour costs. SSCAs were granted 
foreign manning qualifications in the late 1900s with the support of their 
parent shipping companies (PSCs) and the Chinese government. In order 
to improve social stability many SSCAs employ a large number of officer 
seafarers and also ratings who are surplus to require-ments elsewhere in 
the company.  
The SSCA in the case study (hereinafter referred to as Subsidiary Agency 
(SA)), registered in 1995, is a constituent part of what has been the largest 
operator in the entire Chinese shipping industry. It is a subsidiary crewing 
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agency of its local branch shipping company (Figure 2). Before registry, SA 
was the Seafarers’ Resource Administration Department of its PSC, 
responsible for manning the ships of the company and operating a manning 
business with other foreign shipping companies. 
  
The two SCAs that are looked at in the case studies represent the largest 
examples of the two types of Chinese crewing agencies that dominate the 
seafarer labour export. The case studies of them allow us to see the 
operations of the most active and important players in the Chinese seafaring 
labour market. The article will first examine the constraints under which the 
Chinese SCAs operated, then look at the supports of the higher institutions 
and the implications for foreign manning business. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. The structure of the relationship between SA and its PSC and 
head office. 
 
 
The control of the higher institutions 
 
Despite registration as an independent company, SA had little autonomy 
regarding business operations. SA’s clients and business cooperation 
details had to be approved by the PSC before starting the cooperation. PSC 
defined the foremost task of SA as to offer the best manning services to the 
PSC’s ships, rather than enlarging the foreign manning business. The PSC 
enjoyed priority in selecting and employing high-quality seafarers.  
To maintain a high employment rate, the local government restricted SA 
on sacking surplus labour (for the surplus rates, please refer to Table 3), a 
vast majority of whom were ratings according to the Human Research 
Management (HRM) manager. The Vice Director of the head office 
explained the reasons for employing surplus labour as follows: 
 
We need to maintain the stability of society by increasing employment 
opportunities. If surplus workers were fired, the society would not be 
stable and the director of the PSC would be fired. It is the Party that 
leads the company. If you do so [fire the surplus workers], the leaders 
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from the head office will instantly crack down on you. . .so you cannot 
ask SA to be market-oriented. 
 
Concerning the specific HR management strategies, e.g. manning and 
promotion strategies, and material support of seafarers etc., SA was also 
under the strict control of the PSC. Consequently, SA could not be flexible 
in adjusting the management strategies according to changes in the labour 
market. Take the management of seafarers’ material support for example. 
The gross input for the material support of seafarers and managers in SA 
was regulated by the head office of the PSC. When the wages of officer 
seafarers in the Chinese labour market increased rapidly in the mid-2000s, 
the wages of officer seafarers in SA did not increase much. The director of 
the PSC explained: ‘We cannot improve the wages of seafarers according 
to the situation in the labour market because the input for the wages is 
controlled by the head office’.  
In contrast to the low wages of officer seafarers in SA, the ratings in SA 
received much higher wages than market rates as a result of the 
requirement of the head office. In Chinese seafarer labour market freelance 
ratings were redundant, doing manual work for low wages; they are 
excluded from the trade unions and easily exploited (Han 2008; Huang and 
Ning 2008). Providing ratings with high wages, permanent contracts and 
social insurance at the highest standard violated the usual practice in the 
labour market. The HRM manager explained the high material support for 
ratings as follows: 
 
Over 70% of the registered ratings are over 45 years old. We need to 
take care of the elder comrades. It is the tradition of SOE that the 
working-class is the “elder brother”2. Therefore, although the wages of 
the ratings outside the state-owned enterprise are low, we still take care 
of our ratings, providing them with good wages and welfare. After all, 
we are all the working class. 
 
The ratings in SA were very satisfied with their material support. A rating 
said: ‘Ratings are happy with the earnings in this company. It is higher 
than those in other shipping companies or crewing agencies. . . I have 
never heard of any rating resigning from SA’. However, some officer 
seafarers complained such management and thought it was very 
unreasonable. A chief officer said: 
 
The wages of ratings in SA are high. This violates the rule in the labour 
market. We officer seafarers should have been given higher wages 
because there is a shortage of us in the market and we need much 
longer training and face much greater costs than ratings. . . But now 
officer seafarers’ wages in SA are lower than the rates in the domestic 
market. But ratings’ wages are higher. . . This is very unreasonable. 
 
Table 3. The surplus rates of seafarers in some years.  
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Year Number of manned ships 
Demand of 
seafarers1 Number of seafarers on the books 
Surplus 
rate % 
1982 17 612 1619 62 
1995 47 1692 3082 45 
2006 62 2232 3003 25.7 
2013 43 1548 3380 45.8  
 
 
 
Due to low wages, many officer seafarers who are able to find jobs of higher 
wages left the agency. SA suffered from a loss of high-quality seafarers, 
which resulted in the shrinking of the number of foreign ships manned by 
SA, from 24 in 2006 to 9 in 2013. It’s profit in 2013 decreased by 65% of the 
profit in 2006.  
Such control and intervention were not only restricted to SA. Although IA 
is not affiliated to any shipping company, but is supposed to operate 
independently and to be responsible for its profits and losses, interventions 
from its higher institutions can still be seen from the case study. 
 
When IA was set up in 1985 by the municipal government, the Deputy 
Mayor of the city at that time was elected as the first chairman. In 
accordance with the orders of the local government, IA merged with a SOE 
(afterwards became IA’s head office) in 1991. Although IA still operated its 
business independently, the management of IA was supervised by the head 
office for the local government. Some of the agency’s major issues, such as 
the appointment of the director, the distribution of the profits, and the year-
end bonus of the senior and junior managers, were controlled by the head 
office.  
Regarding the distribution of the profits, the head office required IA to 
manage its own costs, including the seafarers’ and managers’ wages (which 
are set by the head office). In addition, IA must handover almost all net 
profits, which cannot be lower than a certain amount set by the head office 
annually. To accomplish this task, IA was unable to pay officer seafarers’ 
competitive wages. When talking about the wage of the officers in IA, the 
managers seemed rather helpless. The Manning manager said: ‘The wage 
of our officers is not high: it is equal to or lower than the average rate in the 
domestic market’. The Director of IA said: 
 
We also want to increase seafarers’ wages. However, the head office 
will not allow this. If we were to give more money to seafarers, the 
agency’s profits would fall. In this case, how can we reach the required 
standard [set up by the head office]? In fact, the managers of the head 
office do not consider the condition of the labour market or adjust the 
requirements accordingly. . . the head office does not allow us to 
become independent, as it would lose the profit that we submit. So we 
are stuck here. 
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The discussion suggests that IA was not really independent in terms of the 
control that it had over its profits. The independence of IA was still quite 
circumscribed by the relationship with the head office. Such control resulted 
in the low wages of seafarers and a mass of officers leaving the agency and 
ultimately, the stagnation of seafaring labour export. The number of foreign 
ships manned by IA in 2008 and 2013 was 37 and 32, respectively.  
In addition to the controls and inventions, the case studies showed that 
SCAs received various kinds of supports from their higher institutions, which, 
however, resulted in managers being reluctant to carry out any reforms. This 
was particularly evident when looking at the case of SA. 
 
 
 
 
 
The support of higher institutions 
 
Despite being registered as an independent company, SA still acted like an 
internal department of the PSC. All costs of the agency, such as material 
support of the managers and seafarers, their training costs and even the 
funding of Trade Union, were afforded by the PSC. Unlike IA, when SA 
made losses, the PSC compensated for it. Depending on the PSC, SA did 
not have to be responsible for its profits and losses. The director of the PSC 
explained the relationship between the PSC and SA: 
 
The agency was registered as a company by the PSC, which means 
one of our departments is qualified to do business with other companies. 
To other companies, the agency is a company; but for the PSC, it is our 
department, as everything of the agency is from us. 
 
With such support, managers in SA were not pressured to carry out any 
reforms. While ignoring reforms or gaining a low profit will not bring the 
managers problems, implementing reforms could be complicated and risky 
and cause trouble to managers. The president of the TU explained this in 
the following way: 
 
Everyone knows the problems of the management but no one talks 
about it. The reason is like this: if nobody changes the management, 
when problems occur, no one will be blamed. This is because the 
problems have existed for 20 years, and have not been caused by any 
of the current managers. But if anyone reformed any strategy, he would 
take the full responsibility and be blamed for any consequences. 
Therefore, it is safer to keep the current strategies rather than reform 
them. 
 
Consequently, the managers would rather choose to stay safe than 
implement a potentially risky reform that might damage their personal 
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interests. This in turn caused the management strategies in SA lacked a 
market orientation in keeping with the economic reform. 
 
 
Lack of reform of management strategies in SA 
 
The manning management was based on the ‘fixed ship, fixed crew’ (FSFC) 
policy, which can be traced back to the beginning of the 1990s. The policy 
requires seafarers assigned onboard a ship to work there consistently until 
they get promoted. Without a systematic method of manning, seafarers who 
were not linked to any ships got few working opportunities from SA. A HRM 
manager said: ‘In the agency, a group of seafarers are so tired because 
they are always called to work onboard ship, while the rest have no 
opportunity at all’.  
The lack of reform of management of seafarers’ promotion resulted in 
slow promotion of seafarers. The regulations implemented in 1991 require 
captains and manning managers to take full responsibility for any mistakes 
onboard ships. Since newly promoted seafarers lacked experience in their 
new position, captains and manning managers did not act positively in 
seafarers’ promotion in order to avoid potential consequences and 
punishment. The manning manager said: 
 
If there is an accident, the director of the PSC or the Head Office will 
first ask the manning manager whether the dispatched seafarers have 
worked in the position before or whether the seafarers have adequate 
experience. If not, the leaders will ask the managers why they 
dispatched those new, inexperienced seafarers. There have been 
some bad examples when manning manager have faced negative 
consequences because they dispatched newly promoted seafarers. 
We have now learned to avoid these mistakes. This is the problem with 
the institutional system. Under this system, seafarers cannot be 
promoted in time, as it is delayed. 
 
Concerning management of seafarers’ training, managers and seafarers 
complained that training opportunities were not systematically planned or 
distributed among seafarers. As a result, some seafarers were trained 
repeatedly in SA while others hardly got any training. The President of TU 
commented on the management of training: 
 
When there is a training opportunity, in many cases, it is the manning 
managers who look for training candidates, not based on any training 
schedule but randomly. . . Because of the lack of any plan, some 
seafarers undertake the same training several times, while others are 
not trained at all. 
 
A rating said: 
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Sometimes, when I am on leave, the manning manager calls me to take 
some training. I had already done those modules several times and I 
don’t want to do them again. But considering my relationship with the 
manning manager and considering that he consistently gives me good 
working opportunities, I cannot refuse him. So I take the lessons. 
 
The low quality of training was also complained about by interviewed 
officers. A second engineer said: 
 
The quality of teachers in the training school is generally low. Some of 
them were once seafarers, but they have not worked onboard ships for 
many years. They are still talking about old knowledge from old books 
in spite of the fast development of the shipping market. 
 
The analysis shows that the reform of the management strategies was 
limited in SA. Seafarers experienced slow promotion, limited working 
opportunities and poor quality of training. This contributed to the loss of high-
quality seafarers and hence limited the increase of seafarer export. 
 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
After 30 years’ economic reform, the volume of Chinese seafarer export is 
much lower than expected by the international shipping industry and some 
foreign academia (Li and Wonham 1999; Sharma 2002; Wu 2004; Wu, 
Shen, and Li 2007). Though the previous researches mentioned some 
obstacles to China’s seafarer export, they took it for granted that the 
problems would be solved naturally with the deepening of the economic 
reform, without discussing the complexity of the problems. They also 
assumed that the emergence of hundreds of crewing agencies in China 
meant the improvement of seafarer labour export, without any research 
looking beneath the quantitative data to examine the operation of the 
crewing agencies or their capacity to man foreign ships.  
A few western social scientists have looked into the reform of Chinese 
SOEs of land-based industries. They argued that, despite the dramatic 
growth of the Chinese economy, the reform of China’s SOEs was still limited 
in terms of managerial autonomy due to the government restrictions 
(Bodmer 2002; Gu 2001; Ho and Young 2013; Yueh 2004; Zhang and 
Rasiah 2014), government’s support of the SOEs (Lewis 2003; Taylor 2005; 
Hung, Wong, and Zhang 2012; Wei, Clegg, and Ma 2015) and the 
maintenance of the traditional administrative ties within the SOE system, 
which gave parent companies strict control over their subsidiaries (Cui and 
Jiang 2012; Hassard et al. 2006).  
However, it has never been considered in shipping industry to what extent 
the SCAs that play a major role in Chinese foreign manning business have 
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reformed into market-oriented enterprises. This article examines this 
question. It draws on 86 interviews conducted between 2008 and 2013 in 
two SCAs, which represent the largest examples of two types of Chinese 
crewing agencies dominating the seafarer labour export. The evidence is 
limited in various ways. Obviously, it comes from just two SCAs and only a 
limited number of managers and seafarers were inter-viewed. Bearing these 
limitations in mind, it is however possible to use this research to explore 
certain questions that are rarely discussed in researches regarding the 
government and the higher institutions’ interventions in the SCAs and the 
extent of their reforms in affecting the seafarers and the seafarer labour 
export.  
With regard to SA, although it was registered as an independent 
enterprise, it received various forms of support and constraints from the 
PSC and governmental departments. SA had little autonomy regarding 
business operations, had to employ surplus seafarers and could not be 
flexible in adjusting the management strategies according to changes in the 
labour market. In addition, depending on the shipping company’s support, 
SA was not entirely responsible for the economic success of its business 
performance. Consequently managers did not need to worry unduly about 
their own job security or reforming the organization. This in turn caused an 
inadequate market orientation in relation to its management strategies. A 
number of problems arose as a result, such as limited working opportunities, 
low-quality training and slow promotion. Because of the problems, many 
seafarers left the agency, which contributed to the shortfall of high-quality 
seafarers in SA, and resulted in the decline of the foreign manning business.  
Even if a SCA was independent of a shipping company and responsible 
for its profits and losses, its operation was still constrained by the 
intervention from higher levels. IA as seen in the analysis was unable to pay 
officers competitive market wages due to head officer’s requirement on the 
profits that IA has to submit. Consequently, some officers resigned due to 
the low wages and IA faced a shortage of seafarers. This constrained the 
volume of the seafarer labour export. 
 
So far, there has been only one foreign-invested crewing agency in China. 
Private-owned crewing agencies develop on a small scale due to the lack 
of support of government. In contrast, the SCAs dominate the foreign 
manning business. However, the case studies of SA and IA, two of the most 
influential foreign manning agencies in China, demonstrate that the SCAs 
may not be as reformed or market-oriented as assumed (Li and Wonham 
1999; Sharma 2002; Wu 2004; Wu, Shen, and Li 2007). Looking at the 
development of the different types of crewing agencies in the Chinese 
seafarer labour market, it seems that the market is still heavily government-
controlled. This partly explains the limited rate of increase of China’s 
seafarer export.  
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Therefore, to improve the market competition for foreign manning 
business and the market orientation of the Chinese SCAs, it may be 
important for the state to relax its control over the Chinese seafarer labour 
market, especially by granting more autonomy and responsibility to the 
crewing agencies to enable managers to act more adequately. This 
research suggests that some of them are prepared for such transition if 
allowed. However, whether this is a good thing from the standpoint of the 
Chinese shipping industry and Chinese economy is another question. 
 
Notes 
 
1. With 24 seafarers onboard each ship and a backup rate of 1.5, 
demand of seafarers equals to (number of manned ships) * 24 * 1.5  
2. In the planned economy, workers were the ‘working class’ and the 
‘masters of enterprises and the state’. Guided by this socialist ideology, 
workers were treated well and also as equally as possible, no matter of 
their skills or capability. Concerning seafaring industry, there was no 
big difference in the wages of seafarers of different ranks. For instance, 
in 1988 a Captains’ wage was around 110–150 USD per month, while 
ratings could earn almost 90 USD. 
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